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COOL FEDERALISM AND THE LIFE-CYCLE OF MORAL
PROGRESS
LAWRENCE G. SAGER*
INTRODUCTION: HOT AND COOL FEDERALISM
We can divide justifications for federalism-based structures of
governance into hot federalism and cool federalism, with the
distinction keyed to the reasons for resorting to a federal structure.
By hot federalism, I mean the use of federal structures of gover-
nance to solve a type of problem that can arise when relatively
settled and coherent social groups seek to create common structures
of governance with other groups. Each group, we can imagine, is
relatively homogeneous, with sufficient commonalities of experience,
belief, commitment, language, and so on, to permit its members to
enjoy a fair amount of trust and comfort with each other as
members of a political community. But between or among the
groups in question, there is substantially less commonality and
substantially less trust and comfort with the prospect of becoming
members of a single political community. The groups in question,
nevertheless, wish to create or perpetuate some form of a trans-
group union. This creates a problem in governance of the form: How
can such groups work together in the face of the reluctance to
concede full and ultimate authority to a trans-group governing
entity?
Hot federalism is very important in the contemporary world, and
the prospects for its success in various modern contexts are
remarkable and exciting. There are reasons, however, to be a bit
wary of the capacity of federal structures to overcome problems of
the hot federalism variety. In the United States, we certainly began
with hot federalism concerns, driven substantially by the issue of
slavery. But our federal structure in this regard was a great failure,
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1385
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
giving on to the tragedy of the Civil War. Recently, we have seen
Canada nearly come apart, and the success of the federal structure
there still seems a close question. Europe is moving rapidly to the
embrace of a trans-national, federal structure of governance-far
more rapidly than many would have imagined remotely possible;
but it is still too early to assess the ultimate success of this extraor-
dinary transition. The miracle of South Africa's constitutionalized
revolution has made important use of a federal structure to permit
wary groups to join under a national rule of law; but here too, it is
a bit early to draw conclusive lessons. And Switzerland has always
seemed too small and quirky to offer lessons for the rest of the
world.
In any event, I mention hot federalism only to set it aside. It is
cool federalism that interests me here. Cool federalism is substan-
tially less ambitious. It aims not at making it possible for groups to
coexist in governance structures that would otherwise be intolerably
threatening, but at the more modest goal of making it possible for
a political community to govern itself better-to get better, cheaper,
or more widely accepted results than would otherwise be possible.
The distinction is crude, but the rough idea is that cool federalism
supports federal structures of governance in situations where it
would be perfectly possible for a unitary structure to operate, but
with the hope that a federal structure will improve governance in
some salient way.
In this rough dichotomy, it seems reasonable to think in general
of functional arguments for federal arrangements in the contempo-
rary United States as claims in the domain of cool federalism.
Indeed, I am inclined to the view that the only interesting argu-
ments available to those who want to promote one or another view
of contemporary federal arrangements in the United States are
functional arguments of the cool federalism variety.
Here, the more precise question I want to reflect upon is the
connection between the shape of the overlapping authority of state




I. THE LIFE CYCLE OF MORAL PROGRESS IN AMERICAN POLITICS
Let us begin with this speculation: It frequently will be the case
that moral progress in the project of securing political justice in the
United States will follow a common course with regard to the
interplay between state and federal sensibilities and consensus.
Things will go roughly like this:
* Invention. Initially, the ideas that we eventually come to see
as representing moral progress will take hold in a small number
of states; other states will be less moved by these ideas, or even
stridently opposed to these ideas. The concrete form assumed by
these maverick ideas in the states where they take hold may be
that of state legislation, state constitutional revision, or judicial
decision--quite possibly in the name of the state constitution or
the United States Constitution. We have some obvious contem-
porary examples of this phase, the most prominent being the
moves toward the normalization and acceptance of gay marital
union in Vermont' and gay marriage in Massachusetts.!
Oregon's path-breaking concern with the right of the terminally
ill to die with dignity' and California's experiment with the
medical use of marijuana4 are other examples.
1. In 1999, the Supreme Court of Vermont interpreted the Common Benefits Clause of
the Vermont Constitution as requiring the state to make the benefits of marriage equally
available to same sex couples, and directed the state legislature to enact legislation that
would secure those benefits. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). The Vermont legislature
responded by endorsing "civil unions" between committed partners of the same sex. The civil
union statute is at pains (1) to insist that such unions are not "marriages," and (2) to establish
that a partner to such a union enjoys all the legal benefits available to a spouse in a marriage.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201-1207 (2002).
2. In 2003, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts went one step further than had
the high court in Vermont, and ruled that same sex couples were entitled to the benefits and
the dignity of civil marriage. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
The Goodridge decision indicates the complexity of federal-state interaction. Although the
Massachussetts court cites the Vermont Baker decision in passing, it attaches considerably
more importance to the Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003),
which held that the Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage
in certain intimate sexual conduct violates the Due Process Clause.
3. Oregon has provided a statutory mechanism whereby terminally ill patients can
secure prescription medication that will bring the end of life. Oregon Death with Dignity Act,
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800-127.897 (2003).
4. Under California law, patients with certain ailments can apply to and enter into a
medicinal marijuana program. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 11362.7-11362.9 (West 2004).
The program members carry identification cards and are allowed to use, possess, and grow
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* Propagation. Over time, as these minority states begin to act
on their commitments, some of these commitments will begin to
have wider appeal. Perhaps experiment and experience will aid
their cause; perhaps the political success of what was previously
a minority view in the cutting edge states will encourage the
spread of political activity elsewhere; perhaps the confluence of
related but external events (scientific discoveries, geopolitical
trends, governmental steps or missteps, etc.) will extend their
influence beyond the boundaries of the cutting edge states; or,
perhaps it will simply be a matter of better moral insights
coming to prevail. This is merely a short, suggestive list of
possibilities. It is not intended to approach an exhaustive
rendition. The bottom line is that gradually support for these
maverick projects grows even in the face of what may be active
opposition.
* Consolidation. Eventually, after these once-maverick moral
insights have come to occupy a place within mainstream
national thought, the federal government may impose those
insights on the remaining-now in some salient sense, outly-
ing-states. This imposition may assume one of several recog-
nized forms: federal legislation, federal judicial judgment in the
name of the Constitution, or constitutional amendment.
This proposed life-cycle of moral progress may seem a figment of
my (admittedly liberal) imagination, fueled by events that occupy a
very thin slice of the historical experience of the United States. I
willingly admit that it is our recent experience with the rights of
gays and lesbians to marry that has drawn my attention to this
structure of moral development. I am, nevertheless, tempted to
think that something like this cycle of events has been characteris-
tic of our most important moral progress. Consider, for example, the
abolition of slavery and the much delayed second abolition of Jim
Crow segregation; the recognition of the right of women to vote, and
the long delayed extension of rights to women in other domains; and
the protection of children from workplace abuse. It seems not just
plausible but likely that we will find recurring instances of the
pattern I have sketched from the best historical accounts of each of
these progressions away from injustice: early commitments in a
specified amounts of marijuana. Id.
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minority of states, growing national acceptance, and finally,
imposition on the remaining, increasingly outlying, states.
This should not surprise us, of course, for there are simple and
obvious features of federalized governance that make it quite
natural for change of all kinds to originate in a minority of states,
and if successful, to propagate throughout the nation.' The states,
by their sheer number and lingering diversity, are going to include
some that develop projects and sensibilities not widely shared in the
nation at large. Consider contemporary state ventures: gay mar-
riage (and the constitutional prohibition of gay marriage); the
opportunity to die with dignity, even if that requires the assistance
of others; and the legalization of the medical use of marijuana.
Naturally, we would expect deviations from the status quo on any
of these issues to occur in a handful of states before any substantial
national support for change was in place. The states have smaller
political bases, greater vulnerability to focused political mobiliza-
tion, a wider range of governing mechanisms (such as legislative
initiatives), and somewhat more homogeneous moral sensibilities,
religious commitments, cultural predilections and commercial bases.
The blunt consequences of a federal system like ours include
breadth of moral imagination and variance in moral judgment.
State courts themselves are promising sources of variation. State
constitutions are notably prolix, and state courts have the broad
resources of the common law and statutory construction rather than
the comparatively narrow substantive portfolio offered by the
United States Constitution. Even when they are enforcing the
Federal Constitution, state courts may be encouraged to defect from
the leadership of the Supreme Court. State courts are typically
much closer to and involved in the state institutions they superin-
tend; with familiarity comes sympathy, skepticism and a willingness
to meddle.6 When state courts want to insulate their dual enforce-
5. Because the focus of these brief remarks is minority state invention and
experimentation, there is a temptation (to which I unfortunately succumb) to refer to the
migration of maverick ideas into national mainstream thought as though it were a matter of
conquering other states one-by-one. Geographic propagation will sometimes characterize this
migration, to be sure. But there might well be other patterns as well, as when concrete
experimentation in a small number of states supports broad national acceptance that, in
effect, bypasses state-by-state development.
6. See Lawrence G. Sager, Foreword: State Courts and the Strategic Space Between the
Norms and Rules Of Constitutional Law, 63 TEXAS L. REV. 959 (1985).
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ment of the Constitution from federal judicial review, the adequate
state grounds doctrine will easily serve that end.
Are there reasons to be optimistic that from variance will come
consensus, and further, that from consensus will come progress?
Arguably, yes. The experience of pioneer states can spur moral
change in a variety of ways. First, there is the simple fact that the
maverick states, by example, make the benefits of their moral
imagination available to the nation. Second, there are the benefits
of experience. Consider the contemporary issues of gay marriage,
the right to die with dignity, and the medical use of marijuana. It is
particularly true of the right to die perhaps, but all three of these
initiatives are fraught with empirical questions about whether they
can work without spawning problems or abuses. The actual
experience of states in working with particular regimes of law with
regard to physician assisted suicide, medically prescribed mari-
juana, or same sex marital unions is sure to influence the course of
events in other states. Third, in those situations where state
invention is driven by judicial decision, state court judges are
considerably closer to the political and regulatory implications of
their justice-driven impulses, and are thereby sometimes more
willing than a federal court to undertake and able to succeed at
radical change.
The complex remedial posture of the Supreme Court of Vermont
with regard to the rights of gay and lesbian couples7 and the
forthright and tough-minded stance of the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts with regard to the same question8 are both far
more imaginable as state court ventures. Having first served the
vital function of thinking and acting upon the heretofore unthink-
able, states on the moral frontier then perform the second valuable
function of living out the experiments to which their moral lights
have led. Justice Brandeis said it famously and well: "It is one of the
happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country."9
7. See supra note 1.
8. See supra note 2.
9. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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II. WHAT REGIME OF FEDERAL AUTHORITY FOLLOWS?
Suppose we are moved by this picture of our federal structure as
an engine for moral progress and want to protect its benefits. What
sort of division of authority between state and federal governments
follows?
This is a difficult question, and one that ultimately is an invita-
tion to replay most if not all of the debates that surround questions
of federalism, including the overarching question of the degree to
which the judiciary ought to rely upon the federal political process
to police itself with regard to federalism-based restraints. We can,
however, make some speculative gestures toward the ideal shape of
federal authority in light of this picture.
Generally speaking, we should seek to restrain premature federal
interference during the experimentation stage, but facilitate robust
federal enforcement once maverick ideas have worked their way into
mainstream judgment. At first blush, this may seem like a contra-
dictory job description for federalism doctrine. But such an elastic
approach may not be entirely out of conceptual or doctrinal reach.
Consider Congress's authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.' ° One way of slowing federal intervention in the name
of Section 5 authority during the early stages of moral experimenta-
tion, but facilitating such intervention later would be to conceive of
Section 5 authority as narrow but deep. Roughly, the idea is this:
We would begin with the basic structure of City of Boerne v. Flores;11
that is, with the Court's view in Flores that Congress's Section 5
authority must be targeted at preventing or remedying violations of
what the Court would agree were principles of constitutional
justice.1" That would be the narrow part; but once principles of
constitutional justice become sufficiently mainstream as to enjoy the
allegiance of the Court, Congress should have remedial authority
equal to the fordable enterprise of ameliorating the entrenched
harms of major constitutional deficits. That would be the deep part.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.").
11. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
12. Id. at 519-20.
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Once the Court has embraced an underlying, basal precept of
constitutional justice, Congress's civil rights remedial authority
should run deep. Three cases illustrate my view. The first is Jones
v. Alfred Mayer Co., 13 which held that Congress has authority under
Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment 4 to enact legislation
prohibiting various forms of private racial discrimination. 5 Jones is
a radical and important decision that we now take rather too much
for granted. The conceptual challenge of Jones involves the gap
between what the Court sees Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment 6 as prohibitingl 7-- which is slavery itself, and which emphati-
cally does not include simple private discrimination, however
pernicious that may be-and that which the Court sees Section 2 of
the Amendment as empowering Congress to prohibit," which just
as emphatically includes simple private discrimination on grounds
of race. The disjuncture is bridged by the Court's view that Congress
has authority under Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment to
eradicate not just slavery, but the pernicious residue that slavery
leaves behind: its awful cultural relics of distrust and disadvan-
tage. 9 Jones, on this view, is fully consistent with Flores in that
Flores restricts Congress to the remediation of recognized constitu-
tional wrongs, while Jones speaks to the depth of congressional
authority to remedy well-recognized constitutional wrongs.
Two more recent cases bracket the applicability of Jones to
gender discrimination and Congress's authority under Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment. In United States v. Morrison," the
majority breezily dismissed the argument that Congress had au-
thority to enact the substantive provisions of the Violence Against
13. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
14. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2 ("Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation.").
15. Jones, 392 U.S. at 439-40.
16. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 ("Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as
a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within
the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.").
17. Jones, 392 U.S. at 439 ('By its own unaided force and effect,' the Thirteenth
Amendment 'abolished slavery, and established universal freedom.") (quoting The Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883)).
18. Id. at 439-40.
19. Id. at 441-43.
20. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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Women Act,2 which made private gender-based violence federally
actionable.22 The Court could find no contemporary behavior by state
or local governments that raised equal protection problems in this
regard, and so could find no constitutional peg upon which Congress
could hang its remedial hat.23
Neither the Court nor the parties, however, considered the
argument offered by simple analogy to Jones. The argument turns
on three propositions. First, there is a long history of state and
federal discrimination against women, comprising, inter alia, exclu-
sion from the franchise, elite public schools, various professional
opportunities, and even independent ownership of property when
married; and, more pointedly, immunizing husbands from legal
oversight of some physical and sexual predations of their wives.
Second, this unhappy history, like slavery, has left behind a
pernicious cultural residue, which includes the vulnerability of
women to violence, particularly at the hands of their husbands.
Third, the substantive provisions of the Violence Against Women
Act are reasonably directed to the remediation of this vulnerability.
On this account, there is no problem of state action. The relevant
constitutional wrongs are part of the historic congeries of federal,
state, and local laws that disadvantaged and disabled women in the
ways we have just catalogued. If the logic of Jones is taken seri-
ously, it would make no sense to demand that state actors be the
addressees of a remedy addressed to the residue of these unconstitu-
tional acts, just as it made no sense in Jones to insist that the
addressees of the anti-discrimination legislation at issue be persons
or entities that had held persons as slaves.24
More recently, the Court decided a Section 5 gender discrimina-
tion case that depends arguably, albeit tacitly, on the Jones
rationale. In Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs,5
the Court upheld the federal Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993
21. Id. at 627.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000).
23. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 626.
24. For a more expansive account of this argument, see LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN
PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE 109-14 (2004).
25. 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
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(FMLA)26 as an exercise of Section 5 authority." The FMLA requires
employers who fall under its aegis to grant employees twelve weeks
of unpaid leave each year to attend to family-related exigencies such
as the birth of a child or the serious health needs of a child, spouse,
or parent.28 The Court was willing to see the FMLA-at least insofar
as it addresses the behavior of state and local government
employers-as reasonable legislation addressing discrimination
against women in the workplace.2 9 Its rationale for so doing ran
something like this: First, many employers grant women caregiving
leaves but withhold them from men;3° second, this perpetuates
discrimination against women twice over, because it both sustains
stereotypes about women as the appropriate caregivers and
discourages employers from hiring women;3 third, merely prohibit-
ing states and other employers from discriminating in this way will
not solve the problem, for employers could respond by giving no
leave at all, thus excluding women-who in fact do far more of the
caregiving-from the workplace.32
Prime among the several puzzles that surround the Hibbs
decision is this: How could the Court-which recently and emphati-
cally insisted that states are not responsible for the mere dispropor-
tionate impact of their rational acts as employers 33 -permit
Congress to rely on the third proposition, which depends on the
disproportionate impact of even-handed state employment prac-
tices?
The most straightforward answer takes us back to Jones v. Alfred
Mayer Co. If the disproportionate impact of otherwise constitutional
state behavior is due to a cultural assignment of roles by gender,
which in turn is part of the legacy of the historic legal disadvantag-
ing of women, then Congress can attack that impact as part of its
26. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2000).
27. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 735.
28. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1).
29. See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 735.
30. Id. at 736.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 738.
33. See Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356,366-68 (2001); see also
SAGER, supra note 24, at 117-21 (discussing Garrett in these terms).
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authority to provide a remedy for this structural legacy of historic
constitutional wrongs.34
In any event, by now the reader has undoubtedly gotten the gist
of what I mean by the narrow but deep authority of Congress under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment after Flores. What other
suggestions for the shape of federal authority are encouraged by our
reflections on the life cycle of moral progress?
Obviously, Congress's broad and more-or-less untamable author-
ity under the Commerce Clause is somewhat problematic in this
context. Here my suggestions are more skeletal and tentative. It
seems both late in the day and improvident in the extreme to seek
barriers to congressional regulation of labor and the workplace, and
disastrous to ignore the ambient externalities of self-regarding state
behavior in matters concerning environmental regulation. More
generally, the extended lesson of our experience with the Commerce
Clause is one that disfavors ongoing judicial oversight of Commerce
Clause authority. But two possible changes in course are suggested
by my life cycle analysis.
The first of these is conditioned on the existence of the deep
authority of Congress to remediate entrenched constitutional
injustice that I have already sketched above. When such deep
authority is firmly in place, it may make sense in extreme cases,
far removed from the substantive heartland of Commerce Clause
concerns, to apply some form of pretextual analysis to legislation
that is fundamentally moral rather than commercial in its aims.
Second, and more interesting, is the possibility that the Court
should presume away from the conclusion that federal legislation
preempts state legislation in the same domain.35 An interpretive
canon that required a plain statement of preemptive intent from
Congress would have two advantages. Given that such a canon
would have bite only when a competitive state regulation was at
risk, it would select those situations where states were actively
working on the problem at hand and make space for state experi-
mentation. Further, such a canon, by making preemptive intent
34. See SAGER, supra note 24, at 124-26.
35. See Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court's Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 41-
51, 115-34 (2004); Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1349,
1377-84 (2001).
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explicit, would give us some reason to suppose that Congress's
willingness to preempt state activity reflected national judgment on
the question at hand.
Thus far, I have discussed the implications of the life cycle of
moral progress hypothesis for the shape of federal legislative
authority. There are implications for direct exercises of federal
judicial authority as well. Here, we do well to attend to Justice
Brandeis's reminder that the states are valuable laboratories of
social experimentation.36 His point was that some constitutional
judgments depend on facts that we can learn only by social experi-
ment, and that the Court should avoid curtailing useful legislative
experiments prematurely. Justice Brandeis was concerned with the
interruption of state economic regulations in the Lochner era.37
Comparable claims for judicial behavior, however, may be apt to
modern experiments in social justice.
Consider the physician-assisted suicide cases in the Supreme
Court.38 For at least four of the justices in those cases, there was
some significant appeal to the claim on behalf of a right to die with
dignity. 9 There were, however, substantial practical concerns about
protecting the infirm from the mendacious pressures of those who
would benefit from their demise."0 Hence the advantages, to which
we have already alluded, of state experimentation in this realm.
Constitutional questions of this sort, wrapped as they are with
practical concerns that can only be addressed by experience, should
encourage the Court to find ways of temporizing with regard to
bottom-line constitutional judgments, rather than foreclosing or
inhibiting future judgments informed by the experience in frontier
states like Oregon. This is what we might call the passive case,
where the Court confronts practical barriers to what might other-
wise be an attractive constitutional mandate, and where the virtues
of experimentation should lead to a conditional rather than a final
refusal to impose such a mandate.
36. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
37. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
38. E.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793
(1997).
39. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 737 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 752 (Stevens, J.,
concurring); id. at 789 (Souter, J., concurring); id. at 792 (Breyer, J., concurring).
40. Id. at 785-87 (Souter, J., concurring).
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There is an active case as well, more directly analogous to Justice
Brandeis's position in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann. Suppose the
Court confronts the constitutionality of the Young Women's
Leadership School of East Harlem, the name of which more or less
tells us what we need to know."1 Where good faith experiments of
this sort are launched under circumstances of considerable empiri-
cal uncertainty, the Court should be hesitant to embrace sweeping
constitutional prohibitions that would close down experiments in
areas of vital social interest. 2
CONCLUSION: BREATHING ROOM
During the last half of the twentieth century, we witnessed a
massive and desperately important national effort to bring our
political community more into conformity with fundamental
principles of political justice, particularly with regard to the historic
fault line of race. That effort often arrayed the Supreme Court,
41. This from a partisan but persuasive source:
Beaconing in an educational system notorious for its overstuffed classrooms and
understuffed budget, The Young Women's Leadership School in East Harlem is
a prime example of what it is to be victorious. From its very origin in 1996, the
middle through high YWLS (Young Women's Leadership School) has incited
controversy and adversarial protest from its mere concept: a nurturing, single
sexed public school for inner-city young women.
Organizations like NYC-NOW ... and the ACLU ... have, from day one,
vigorously fought for the demise of a school with bragging rights of a 100%
graduation/college acceptance rate....
This past June, YWLS was delighted to present to the world its first ever
graduating class, a grand tally of 32 girls--every single one accepted and
enrolled into a four-year college, with only a course deviation of one girl, who
opted to go into the Air Force instead. Eighteen of them have received full-
tuition scholarships. Of the graduating class, 90 percent are the first generation
in their families to have ever enlisted into a university, 25 percent are
immigrants, and almost three quarters live below the poverty line. "Despite
disadvantages like poverty, the girls at the Young Women's Leadership School of
East Harlem have amassed an impressive record," says the New York Times,[I
as New York City school chancellor Harold Levy has said that YWLS "outshone
everyone's expectations."
Danya Steele, They Can't Do That!! ... Can They?, HARLEM LIVE (2001), at http://www.
harlemlive.org/communityEducationTrioSchool/YWLS/ywlsl.html.
42. The claim on behalf of a constitutional jurisprudence that accommodates
governmental experimentation has been pressed effectively and explored engagingly in
Michael C. Doff & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98
COLUIm. L. REV. 267 (1998).
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Congress, and other federal entities against recalcitrant state and
local actors. For those of us who lived through those events directly
or who have had occasion to revisit it as a matter of modern history,
it is easy to lose sight of an important and obvious feature of
American political life: State experimentation on the frontiers of
political justice is often an important first step in moral progress.
These brief thoughts have been aimed at remembering this virtue
of our federal political structure, to the end of finding breathing
room for maverick and majestic state efforts to continue in the
pursuit of justice.
